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Abstract. Anomaly Detection (AD) sensors compute behavior profiles
to recognize malicious or anomalous activities. The behavior of a host is
checked continuously by the AD sensor and an alert is raised when the
behavior deviates from its behavior profile. Unfortunately, the majority
of AD sensors suffer from high volumes of false alerts either maliciously
crafted by the host or originating from insufficient training of the sensor.
We present a cluster-based AD sensor that relies on clusters of behavior
profiles to identify anomalous behavior. The behavior of a host raises an
alert only when a group of host profiles with similar behavior (cluster
of behavior profiles) detect the anomaly, rather than just relying on the
host’s own behavior profile to raise the alert (single-profile AD sensor). A
cluster-based AD sensor significantly decreases the volume of false alerts
by providing a more robust model of normal behavior based on clusters
of behavior profiles. Additionally, we introduce an architecture designed
for the deployment of cluster-based AD sensors. The behavior profile of
each network host is computed by its closest switch that is also respon-
sible for performing the anomaly detection for each of the hosts in its
subnet. By placing the AD sensors at the switch, we eliminate the possi-
bility of hosts crafting malicious alerts. Our experimental results based
on wireless behavior profiles from users in the CRAWDAD dataset show
that the volume of false alerts generated by cluster-based AD sensors is
reduced by at least 50% compared to single-profile AD sensors.
Keywords. Network-based Anomaly Detection Sensors, False Alert Re-
duction, Behavior Profile Clustering, Wireless Users.
1 Introduction
Anomaly Detection (AD) sensors are technologies designed to detect anomalies
in the behavior of a host. AD sensors compute the behavior profile of a host
by using a set of statistical features that characterize its typical use of services.
Any behavior that deviates from the behavior profile is deemed anomalous and
an alert is generated [3]. While AD sensors provide an effective way of detecting
anomalous behavior, most are plagued with high volumes of false alerts. These
false alerts may originate either from the AD sensor itself because of poor or
insufficient training, or else from a host that is maliciously trying to generate
alerts.
Redundancy has been proposed as a means to reduce the volume of false
alerts [1], [13], [16]. Each network host is assigned multiple sensors that observe
and model its behavior through different correlated parameters. Alerts are gener-
ated whenever an agreement is reached among multiple sensors. By redundantly
modeling the same behavior with different types of sensors, the generation of
false alerts either maliciously crafted or due to insufficient training is greatly
reduced. Nevertheless, redundancy tends to overload the host since the compu-
tation of profiles takes away computing cycles from real host applications.
Collaboration through alert sharing has been explored as a way to correlate
alerts to detect coordinated attacks, indirectly reducing the number of false alerts
[10], [11], [14]. AD sensors across one or multiple domains share alerts amongst
themselves and then perform a correlation analysis to understand their nature.
Contemporary alerts may be related to the same event, possibly an attack. Alerts
not found by any other collaborating host should probably be considered false
alerts. This approach can significantly reduce the volume of false alerts when
coordinated attacks take place; however, it leaves each sensor on its own during
isolated attacks on single hosts since other sensors in the network do not observe
the attack. We extend the idea of alert sharing to behavior-profile sharing as a
way to reduce the number of false alerts during isolated attacks.
In this paper, we present a cluster-based AD sensor that relies on the use of
clusters of behavior profiles to perform the anomaly detection. As introduced in
[4] and [5], a cluster of behavior profiles constitutes a collection of profiles from
hosts behaving similarly. In a cluster-based AD sensor, the behavior of each host
is compared against its own profile as well as against the profiles of the hosts
within its own cluster of behavior profiles. An alert is generated only when all
the profiles in the cluster of behavior profiles agree on the anomalous nature
of a certain host. In contrast, a single-profile AD sensor compares the behavior
of the host only against its own behavior profile. Consequently, a cluster-based
AD sensor provides a more informed decision for the generation of alerts than a
single-profile AD sensor since a group of profiles representing a similar behavior
offers a more robust description of behavior normalcy.
Apart from the design of the sensor, we envision its actual deployment in a
network as a key component of our proposal. In particular, we focus on the de-
ployment in small- to medium-sized networks e.g., enterprise or university. The
deployment of AD sensors in a network can follow a fully distributed or a hi-
erarchical architecture. Fully distributed architectures such as CSM [16] locate
at least one AD sensor on each host. Each sensor is then responsible for the
behavior-profile modeling, the alert generation, and the alert analysis. On the
other hand, hierarchical approaches separate the profile computation and alert
generation (performed at the host) from the alert analysis that takes place in
higher-ranked monitors or correlating hosts [1], [12]. Unfortunately, the place-
ment of the alert generation on the host opens the possibility that a compromised
host may maliciously craft an alert. We propose an architecture where each net-
work switch is responsible for computing and updating the behavior profiles of
all the network hosts in its subnet. These behavior profiles are then exchanged
among switches and clustered to identify the clusters of behavior profiles in the
network. Armed with these clusters, each switch can perform a cluster-based
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anomaly detection for each of the hosts in its subnet. More importantly, by
performing the anomaly detection at the switches, hosts are prevented from
maliciously crafting false alerts.
Throughout the paper, we make four key assumptions. First, all commu-
nications are secure. As a result, behavior profiles cannot be modified during
exchanges. Second, hosts openly share their profiles with switches but not with
other hosts in the network. Third, the AD sensors compute behavior profiles of
hosts based on their network activity. Finally, we assume that switches are more
robust to attacks than individual hosts. Our main contributions are:
• A cluster-based AD sensor that uses clusters of behavior profiles to achieve
a more informed decision for the generation of alerts. In contrast to single-
profile AD sensors, a group of profiles representing a similar behavior con-
stitute a more robust description of behavior normalcy for a host.
• An architecture where the behavior-profile modeling of each host and its
anomaly detection is performed at its closest switch. As a consequence, the
possibility of false alert generation from compromised hosts is eliminated.
• An evaluation with 100 real user behavior profiles computed from traces of
wireless traffic captured at Dartmouth University (CRAWDAD repository).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the cluster-based AD sen-
sor, Section 3 presents an architecture designed for the deployment of cluster-
based AD sensors in a network, Section 4 describes the experimental results and
presents a comparative analysis between single-profile and cluster-based AD sen-
sors, Section 5 provides estimates of the network bandwidth requirements associ-
ated with the deployment of cluster-based AD sensors, and Section 6 summarizes
related work. Lastly, conclusions and future work are covered in Section 7.
2 Cluster-Based Anomaly Detection Sensor
Current network-based AD sensors compute the behavior profile of a host based
on its normal network activity. In order to detect anomalous activities, the AD
sensor compares the input or output traffic to or from a host against its behavior
profile. Any behavior that deviates from the profile is considered anomalous and
generates an alert. We shall refer to this type of AD sensor as single-profile since
it only compares the traffic against its own behavior profile. While this approach
is effective in detecting anomalous behavior, it suffers from high volumes of false
alerts mainly generated from insufficient or poor training data.
In order to alleviate this shortcoming, we introduce a cluster-based AD sensor
that relies not only on the host’s own profile but also on the behavior profiles
of other hosts that share a similar behavior in the network. The advantage of
this approach is that it provides a broader definition of normal behavior that
compensates for insufficient or poor training data in single-profile AD sensors.
As a result, cluster-based AD sensors can potentially lower the volume of false
alerts. Similar to a single-profile AD sensor, a cluster-based AD sensor computes
the behavior profile of a host based on its network activity. But rather than
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relying only on its own behavior profile for the anomaly detection, it makes
use of clusters of behavior profiles. A cluster of behavior profiles represents a
set of host profiles that share similar network behavior [5]. For instance, one
could differentiate between a cluster of behavior profiles consisting of highly
active hosts with a large number of frequent connections to different IPs and
another cluster made up of less active hosts that connect to fewer IPs with lower
frequency. A cluster-based AD sensor performs the anomaly detection for a host
by comparing the traffic exchanged by the host against its own behavior profile
and against the behavior profiles in the cluster where the host is a member e.g.,
the cluster-based AD sensor of a highly active host would compare the traffic
exchanged by the host only against the profiles of other highly active hosts. An
alert is generated only when all the profiles in the cluster of behavior profiles
agree on the anomalous nature of the traffic as opposed to single-profile anomaly
detection that generates an alert when the traffic is considered anomalous only
by its own behavior profile.
In practical terms, whenever a host i sends or receives traffic, its sensor Si
verifies whether it is within one standard deviation σ of its behavior profile pi
and all the other profiles pm of the cluster c where pi is a member (see Equation
1). The sensor compares the traffic t against each profile pm in the cluster and
emits a partial decision Dpm(t) regarding the anomalous or normal nature of the
traffic. If all the partial decisions agree on the anomalous nature of the traffic,
the sensor generates an alert Si = 1. Otherwise, the sensor deems the traffic
normal Si = 0. Hence, Si is defined as follows,
Si =
{





0 if pm − σ < t < pm + σ
1 otherwise
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) highlight the differences between a single-profile and
a cluster-based AD sensor for a network host X that shares similar behavior
with network hosts Y and Z. In a single-profile AD sensor, the traffic to or
from host X is only checked for anomalies against its own profile pX . In this
instance, anomalous traffic is detected and an alert is generated by the sensor
(see Figure 1(a)). The cluster-based AD sensor, on the other hand, compares the
traffic to or from host X against the behavior profiles pX , pY , and pZ . While
the sensor generates an alert comparing the traffic to behavior profile pX , the
traffic is not deemed anomalous when compared to behavior profiles pY and
pZ (see Figure 1(b)). As a result, the alert from host X is dismissed as a false
alert and the traffic is deemed normal. Such an alert could have been due to
insufficient or poor training of pX and the cluster-based AD sensor eliminates it
successfully. In other words, a cluster-based AD sensor can also be understood
as an automatic online tuning for single-profile AD sensors whereby the profiles








(a) Single-profile AD sensor for traffic










(b) Cluster-based AD sensor for traffic
to or from host X.
Fig. 1.
3 Architecture
After describing the principles of cluster-based AD sensors, the next crucial step
is the design of an architecture that maximizes their efficiency on an actual
network. In our architecture, each network switch has one cluster-based AD
sensor for each of the hosts within its subnet. Initially, the switch computes
the behavior profiles of each of its hosts using their individual cluster-based AD
sensors. Alternatively, the computation of the profiles could be performed on the
hosts themselves and then submitted to its closest switch to avoid overloading the
switch with excessive computation. Upon computation of the behavior profiles
from all the hosts in its subnet, each network switch submits the profiles to a
central router. This central router then executes a clustering algorithm to identify
clusters of behavior profiles. Each resulting cluster is composed of profiles from
network hosts that share similar behavior.
These clusters of behavior profiles are then broadcasted to each switch such
that a definition of normal types of behavior in the network is known all across.
Figure 2 shows the schematics of the architecture. In particular, the central
router broadcasts the computed clusters of behavior profiles to all the switches
in the network. As shown, the architecture that we present applies to both wired
and wireless networks. In the wired case, hosts are directly connected to the
switch. On the other hand, wireless hosts communicate with the switch through
an access point. Throughout, we assume that the switch has the capability to
perform the computation of profiles as well as the anomaly detection, or else that
there exists a group of dedicated hosts connected to the switch performing these
activities. It is important to note that by performing the anomaly detection at
the switches, hosts are prevented from maliciously crafting false alerts.
Once the clusters of behavior profiles have been broadcasted by the central
router, each network switch proceeds to update the cluster information. Each
cluster-based AD sensor Si on the switch is updated with its respective cluster










Fig. 2. Schematics of the architecture. The arrows depict the broadcast of the clusters
of behavior profiles from the central router to all switches in the network.
behavior with host i. At this stage, the cluster-based AD sensors are ready to
perform the anomaly detection on the traffic exchanged among network hosts.
The traffic to or from each host is compared against its own profile as well as
against the profiles of the hosts within its own cluster of behavior profiles. An
alert is generated only when all the profiles in a cluster of behavior profiles agree
on the anomalous nature of the traffic.
Figure 3(a) depicts a traffic exchange between two hosts (from host A to
host E in this case). Each switch has a cluster-based AD sensor for each host
i in its subnet. These cluster-based AD sensors Si store the respective cluster
of behavior profiles that contains the profiles of the hosts with similar behavior
to i. In this instance, four different clusters of behavior have been identified
by the central router (see Figure 3(b)) and broadcasted to each switch. The
anomaly detection that takes place when host A sends traffic to host E proceeds
as follows: traffic from host A goes through switch1 which forwards the traffic
to the cluster-based AD sensor of host A (SA). This sensor checks the normalcy
of the traffic by comparing it against its own behavior profile pA and against
all remaining profiles of the cluster where host A is a member i.e., cluster2 that
contains the profiles pB and pC . From the comparison with the profiles, the
sensor emits three partial decisions DpA , DpB , DpC regarding the nature of the
output traffic from host A (see Equation 2). If all the partial decisions agree
on the anomalous nature of the traffic, the sensor generates an alert SA = 1.
Otherwise, the sensor deems the traffic normal SA = 0.
SA =
{

















(a) Schematics of a network with mul-
tiple switches and hosts (circles). Each
box within the switch represents a
cluster-based AD sensor for each of the
hosts in the subnet. The arrows indi-













(b) Clusters of behavior profiles deter-
mined by the clustering algorithm. In
this instance, four different clusters of
behavior profiles have been identified
by the central router among all hosts
in the network.
Fig. 3.
Similarly, when traffic arrives to switch2, the cluster-based AD sensor of host
E (SE), checks it not only against its own behavior profile pE but also against
the profiles in the cluster where E is a member i.e., cluster3 that contains the
behavior profiles pM and pN . Equation 3 summarizes the decision making process
that takes place on SE ,
SE =
{
1 if ∀pi ∈ cluster3 Dpi(t) = 1
0 otherwise
(3)
3.1 Behavior Profiles and Clusters Update
Over time, network hosts may change their behavior thus requiring the compu-
tation of new profiles as well as the update of the cluster distribution. Whenever
new behavior profiles are computed by the cluster-based AD sensors, these are
sent to the central router which updates the cluster distribution. Once updated,
the new cluster distribution is broadcasted to all the switches in the network.
The update of each behavior profile is not performed continuously, instead each
profile is trained by epochs whenever major changes in the behavior of the host
occur. In Section 5 we evaluate the frequency of profile update and its network
bandwidth requirements.
It is important to clarify that by locating the profile computation and the
anomaly detection on the switch, we eliminate the possibility of a host lying
about the existence of an alert. However, if the computation of the behavior
profiles is performed at the hosts rather than at the switch, it is possible that
the host itself fabricates a malicious profile that deems anomalous traffic as nor-
mal. To guard against this possibility, the central router must be enhanced by
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incorporating an algorithm such as the one presented in [5]. Prior to comput-
ing the new cluster distribution, the algorithm would allow the central router
to differentiate between new profiles that differ slightly from previous profiles
(concept drift) and hosts trying to maliciously craft their profiles (attacks).
4 Experimental Results and Comparative Analysis
In this section, we present an actual evaluation of cluster-based AD sensors based
on real behavior profiles from wireless users. We also contrast these results with
similar experiments performed with single-profile AD sensors. For this purpose,
we proceeded to compute behavior profiles of wireless users in a real network. We
used tcpdump data containing packet headers of wireless traffic captured from
users at Dartmouth College. Specifically, we employed one month of traffic from
the Fall03 tcpdump dataset (163GB) in the CRAWDAD repository [2]. This
month of traffic was assumed to be clean of attacks and was thus considered
ground truth. We focused our analysis on four distinct ports (services): port
21 (ftp), port 22 (ssh), port 25 (smtp), and port 80 (http). For each port, we
randomly identified 100 different MAC addresses that exhibited output traffic to
the service. Each MAC address was assumed to represent a different user in the
network. Moreover, we associated each user with a unique host in the network
i.e., there were no hosts with multiple users. Hereafter, we use the terms host
and user interchangeably.
We computed the behavior profile of each of these users on a per-port basis
adopting the first week of the month as the training set. To be able to detect
different types of network-based attacks, both control and data packets were
considered during training. We defined the behavior profile pi (see Equation 4)
of user i as a set of hourly histograms hfn for each feature fn, where fn represents
a measure of network-related statistics. Specifically, the following features were
modeled: average number of unique users contacted per hour, average number
of packets exchanged per hour, and average length of the packets exchanged per
hour. Each histogram hfn , computed per port (service) and direction (input or
output), represents the hourly average and standard deviation for a feature fn.
The hourly average aj and hourly standard deviation σj were measured each
hour j of the day and averaged throughout the duration of the training period.
Hence,
pi = {hf1 , ..., hfn} (4)
hfn = {(a0, σ0), (a1, σ1), ..., (a23, σ23)}
The performance of the single-profile and cluster-based AD sensors was quan-
tified using two parameters: the false positive rate (FP) and the detection thresh-
old (Φ). The FP measures the fraction of normal traffic that has been erroneously
considered anomalous over all the testing traffic. In the case of a single-profile
AD sensor, the hourly traffic t of a user was considered anomalous when it devi-
ated more than one standard deviation σj from its own behavior profile hourly
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average aj . In contrast, the cluster-based AD sensor checked that the hourly
traffic t was within one standard deviation σj of its own profile hourly average
aj as well as within one standard deviation of the hourly averages of all the
members of its own cluster (see Equation 1).
Due to the fact that the Dartmouth wireless traffic did not contain any worm
traces, a direct measurement of the detection rate (anomalous traffic detected as
such) was not feasible. Instead, we defined a new parameter, Φi, that represents
the detection threshold used by the AD sensor of user i to determine whether
certain traffic was anomalous. We hypothesize that the detection threshold Φi of
a sensor is correlated to its detection rate and thus provides an indirect measure-
ment of its trend. For the single-profile AD sensor, we computed the detection
threshold Φi(j) per hour j for user i by adding the standard deviation to the
average value observed during training for a specific hour i.e., Φi(j) = aj + σj .
On the other hand, the value of the detection threshold Φi(j) for the cluster-
based AD sensor was computed by determining the maximum value among the
detection thresholds Φm(j) of all the profiles in the cluster c where i is a member.
Hence,
Φi(j) = ∀m ∈ c MAX(Φm(j)) (5)
This is consistent with the assumption that traffic is considered anomalous
only when all profiles in a cluster agree. As a result, the cluster detection thresh-
old Φi(j) corresponds to the maximum value among all cluster members. Finally,
the average value Φi for each single-profile and cluster-based AD sensor was com-
puted by averaging the 24 hourly detection thresholds Φi(j).
For each of the four ports, the 100 user behavior profiles were clustered with
the k-means algorithm [5]. Armed with these clusters of behavior profiles, we
assigned a cluster-based AD sensor to each of the 100 selected users. Using the
second week of the CRAWDAD tcpdump data as the testing set, we proceeded
to compute the FP and Φi of each cluster-based AD sensor. The resulting values
were then averaged to produce the average FP (FP ) and the average Φi (Φ)
across all users. For comparison purposes, we repeated the same tests assigning
a single-profile AD sensor to each of the 100 users.
Figure 4 summarizes the FP for the cluster-based and single-profile AD
sensors calculated for ports 21, 22, 25, and 80. The results show the FP when
the behavior profiles of the sensors are modeled with the following features:
hourly average number of unique users contacted (i), hourly average number
of packets exchanged (ii), hourly average length of the packets exchanged (iii),
or a combination of the three features (iv). As can be seen from Figure 4, the
FP of cluster-based AD sensors is lower than that of single-profile AD sensors
across different features and ports. In all cases, the cluster-based FP rate is at
least halved when compared to its single-profile counterpart. On the other hand,
Figure 5 depicts the ratio of cluster-based Φ (Φcluster) to single-profile Φ (Φsingle)
for ports 21, 22, 25, and 80. Ratios per port are reported for profiles modeled
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Fig. 4. FP rates for single-profile and cluster-based AD sensors computed for ports
80, 21, 22, and 25. Average rates per port are reported for profiles modeled with the
following features: number of unique users contacted (i), number of packets exchanged
(ii), length of the packets exchanged (iii) and a combination of these three features
(iv). As can be seen, the FP rate of cluster-based AD sensors is at least halved when
compared to single-profile AD sensors.
packets exchanged (ii), and length of the packets exchanged (iii). The ratio for
the combination of these three features (iv) corresponds to the set of individual
ratios for each feature and is thus omitted from the Figure. In this instance,
we chose to display ratios rather than the individual values of Φ in order to
normalize the results to the same scale. The ratios shown in Figure 5 indicate that
the cluster-based Φ is increased by at most 1/6 of its single-profile counterpart
across all features and ports. The main conclusion we draw from these results
is that on average a cluster-based AD sensor can significantly decrease the FP
rate while slightly increasing Φi with respect to a single-profile AD sensor. While
it may be argued that a single-profile AD sensor could potentially be tuned to
accomplish similar performances as the cluster-based AD sensor, we believe the
latter approach still enhances single-profile AD sensors by providing a way to
automatically tune FP and Φi guided by the boundaries imposed by the behavior
profiles in the cluster.
The decrease in the cluster-based FP rates is possibly related to the fact
that most false alerts correspond to tiny fluctuations in the average value of
the features, which are greatly reduced when compared to the profile of other
users with similar behavior. These tiny fluctuations may be related to the high
variability of wireless networks in terms of packet fragmentation or packet re-
dundancy, which prevents the acquisition of a robust behavior profile. Although
one may intuitively think that training the behavior profile for longer periods



























Fig. 5. Ratio of cluster-based Φ (Φcluster) to single-profile Φ (Φsingle) computed for
ports 80, 21, 22, and 25. Ratios per port are reported for profiles modeled with the
following features: number of unique users contacted (i), number of packets exchanged
(ii), and length of the packets exchanged (iii). The ratio for the combination of these
three features (iv) corresponds to the set of individual ratios for each feature and is
thus omitted from the Figure. Ratios are above unity which we interpret as a slight
increment in the detection threshold of each sensor (Φi).
wireless users change frequently in relatively short periods of time. Thus, the
identification of clusters of users that share similar behavior provides a broader
view of normal behavior in short training periods and enhances the robustness
of the anomaly detection by decreasing the volume of false alerts.
5 Network Bandwidth Requirements
Behavior profiles are computed as a set of histograms, where each histogram
represents a specific feature and is composed of 24 hourly averages. The sim-
plest profile consisting of a single histogram has an approximate size of 97 bytes.
More complex profiles similar to the ones used in our experiments with three
histograms (three features) for four different ports can reach a size of 1164bytes.
Therefore, the communication of a profile to the central router in our experi-
mental setup implies a bandwidth use of at most ∼ 1KByte. Every time the
central router receives an updated profile, it proceeds to recompute the clusters
of behavior profiles and to broadcast the new configuration to all the switches in
the network. Assuming a network of 10,000 machines, the broadcast to all the
switches would amount to a transmission between 970KBytes and 11.6MBytes.
A transmission between 970KBytes and 11.6MBytes constitutes an accept-
able bandwidth use for a one-time transaction. However, because this trans-
mission is to be performed every time a behavior profile is updated, it is also
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important to estimate the frequency of the profile updates which will then pro-
vide an actual measure of the total bandwidth requirements. In order to estimate
this frequency, we randomly selected a group of users from the same tcpdump
file as in our experiments. Each individual user was trained and tested for three
different lengths of time: 1) training for the first week of data and computing the
FP for the second week of data, 2) training for the first two weeks of data and
computing the FP for the third week of data, and 3) training for the first three
weeks of data and computing the FP for the fourth week of data. For simplicity,
tests were only conducted using the number of packets exchanged on port 80,


























Fig. 6. Evolution of False Positive Rates (%) for different training lengths of wireless
users in the CRAWDAD dataset.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the FP rate for three distinct users (type-1,
type-2, and type-3 ) representative of common patterns among other users in the
dataset. Users similar to type-1 displayed low FP rates following the first week
of training, which can be interpreted as little variability in behavior between the
first and the second week. After two weeks of training, users similar to type-1
experienced a peak in the FP rate. Examining the behavior profiles, we noticed
that this FP peak was related to a sudden increase in the hourly average values
of the number of packets exchanged. After three weeks of training, the FP rate
decreased to levels comparable to the first week. Users similar to type-2 displayed
low FP rates after the first and second weeks of training. A peak in the FP rate
was reached after three weeks of training that was also associated to an increase
in the number of packets exchanged. Finally, users similar to type-3 displayed a
slightly decreasing FP rate over the three different training lengths.
This analysis shows that wireless users are very dynamic and as a result their
behavior profiles change frequently on scales as short as one week. If all the users
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in the network synchronize the beginning of their training periods, the broadcast
of the new configuration of clusters of behavior profiles would need to be done on
a weekly timescale e.g., on a weekend night. Therefore, the possibility of network
saturation is greatly reduced. Clearly, our analysis does not account for every
single user behavior in the network, but it shows distinct behavioral patterns
shared by a significant fraction of users.
6 Related Work
6.1 False Alert Reduction through Redundancy
Redundancy has been widely studied in the literature as a means to enhance
the security of a system [6], [9]. The Cooperative Security Managers (CSM)
approach describes a fully distributed intrusion detection system without any
central coordinator [16]. In this approach, each intrusion detection (ID) sensor
located on a host focuses on detecting anomalies in the behavior of its local
users. Furthermore, each ID sensor may model the behavior of users from other
hosts and confront any alert with the original host. The AAFID architecture
uses redundancy as a means to enhance the performance of anomaly detection
sensors [1], [13]. AAFID employs multiple agents that work in parallel within a
host to detect anomalous behavior. Final decisions on the nature of the behavior
are reached only when different host agents agree.
The main problem associated with redundancy is its tendency to overload
the host since the ID sensor computations take away computing cycles from real
host applications. In our approach, a form of redundancy is achieved through
the use of clusters of behavior profiles. Specifically, the AD sensor of each host
is enhanced with behavior profiles of hosts with similar behavior. Through these
clusters of behavior, the sensor manages to gather a form of redundant infor-
mation without having to compute multiple profiles but rather by exchanging
behavior profiles with other hosts. This enhancement reduces the volume of false
alerts while keeping the computational load balanced.
6.2 False Alert Reduction through Collaboration
EMERALD is amongst the first architectures to incorporate the use of collabo-
rative sensors to correlate alerts within one network or across different domains
for anomaly detection [12]. The use of correlation algorithms aids in the detec-
tion of coordinated attacks while decreasing the volume of false alerts. GrIDS
collects network activity from various locations within the network and builds
graphs that help discover large-scale coordinated attacks [14]. WORMINATOR
is a system that exchanges alerts based on anomalous content detected by AD
sensors installed in hosts across different institutions [10], [11]. DShield is a
community-based collaborative log-correlation system [15].
These collaborative approaches can work effectively as long as there exists
a coordinated attack on different hosts in the network. However, alert sharing
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is less effective in reducing the volume of false alerts during isolated attacks on
a single host since other sensors in the network do not observe the attack. In
our approach, we introduce collaboration through profile sharing in the form of
cluster of behavior profiles. By sharing behavior profiles rather than alerts, the
AD sensor can reduce the volume of false alerts in isolated attacks. This follows
from the fact that the attacked host stores other similar host behavior profiles
and can predict their decision had they observed the attack.
6.3 Deployment of AD Sensors
AD sensors can been deployed in different types of architectures [9]. The CSM
architecture is a fully distributed architecture that locates an ID sensor on each
of the hosts in the network [16]. The hosts are then responsible for their own
anomaly detection as well as for correlating alerts coming from other ID sensors
located in other hosts. The NADIR architecture uses a hierarchical approach
where service nodes located at Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Integrated
Computed Network (ICN) are responsible for the anomaly detection while the
alert analysis is performed at a central expert system [7]. The AAFID architec-
ture also employs a hierarchical approach where each host has multiple sensor
agents that generate different types of alerts [1]. These alerts are then processed
at higher level monitors.
A weakness in locating the anomaly detection on the individual hosts is that it
potentially allows them to fabricate false alerts. In our architecture, the switches
are responsible for computing the behavior profile of the hosts in its subnet as
well as for the anomaly detection. Thus, the possibility of a host maliciously
crafting an alert or lying about its own profile is eliminated.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a cluster-based AD sensor that reduces the volume of false
alerts generated by single-profile AD sensors. The advantage of this approach is
that it uses clusters of behavior profiles to provide a broader definition of nor-
mal behavior that compensates for poor or insufficient training data commonly
observed in single-profile AD sensors. We have also introduced an architecture
design that maximizes the efficiency of cluster-based AD sensors. In our archi-
tecture, the anomaly detection is performed on the switches rather than on the
hosts, thus eliminating the possibility of false alerts maliciously crafted by the
hosts. We have experimentally shown that for real wireless users in the CRAW-
DAD dataset the volume of false alerts using cluster-based AD sensors is at least
halved when compared to single-profile AD sensors.
Future work will focus on evaluating cluster-based AD sensors using profiles
that model additional features related to specific network attacks e.g., number
of SYN/ACK packets to detect SYN flood attacks. We also plan to analyze
more simplistic temporal models other than histograms such as daily and hourly
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averages. Lastly, we will evaluate the impact of shorter and longer profile training
periods on the performance of cluster-based AD sensors.
The work presented thus far has relied on behavior profiles that model the
characteristics of the network traffic exchanged by a host. In the future, we plan
to extend our work to behavior profiles computed based on user or application
characteristics at the hosts e.g., commands executed by a user or the interaction
between an application and the operating system. The main goal will be to
understand whether profiles based on user or application behavior can be used
effectively by cluster-based AD sensors to reduce the volume of false alerts.
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